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Translation and convergence in projects: an organisational perspective on 
project success 
 
Introduction 
The increasing complexity of the project management task has led to debate about the 
way projects are currently managed and to the search for new concepts and theories 
through which to understand and support the project management function. This has 
given rise to a number of initiative, such as the present ‘Making Projects Critical 
series of workshops (Hodgson and Cicmil, 2006) and the EPSRC Rethinking Project 
Management research network (Winter and Smith, 2006), that seek alternative 
perspectives to the conventional understanding of projects and project management as 
embodied in the standard bodies of knowledge (PMI, 2004; APM, 2006).  
 
This paper presents some of our own thinking in this context that focuses on the 
complex social aspects of managing projects and identifies theories and concepts we 
believe to be relevant to understanding and managing them (Alderman et al, 
forthcoming). The key difficulty with complex projects is that those managing them 
will often be ‘feeling their way’ towards a solution rather than following a reliable 
blueprint or project plan. Building a building to a detailed specification using known 
technologies requires traditional planning and work break down (even then there is 
likely to be an extensive snagging list) whereas delivering an exhibition experience to 
mark the millennium, or a government building to capture the spirit of a country to a 
diverse and demanding client or a new airport terminal deploying untried technology 
to serve the needs of two organisations, is a quite different matter   The management 
problems multiply when one considers that implementing the solution must also be 
done in the context of suppliers, consultants and partners who may themselves also be 
feeling their way toward what is required of them. This requires, in our view, new 
models of projects which account for the more illusive and less easily articulated and 
largely tacit skills of project managers. To do so we draw on the work of actor 
network theorists, sense making and the notions of organic and mechanistic styles of 
organisation.   
 
Projects as Actor-Networks 
Attempts to engage in complex project activities involve considerable management 
and organizational challenges in terms of the building and maintaining of extended 
project networks. The idea of managing as an actor-network building and maintaining 
activity introduces a more nuanced way of thinking through the problems and 
conundrums faced by project managers. It makes clear that, rather than simply 
monitoring the execution of packages of work agreed at the outset of the project to 
ensure adherence to quality, time and cost objectives, the role of the project manager 
(and others that hold influence within the project) is primarily one of developing and 
managing relationships across an extended network of actors – human and non-
human. The competencies required to do this might include the ability to assess the 
likely motivations and barriers to action of a wide range of actors in different 
technical and organizational settings and the ability to translate that knowledge into 
effective influence over those actors. Actor-network theory (Callon, 1980; Law 1992; 
Latour, 1996) addresses precisely these issues.  
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Actor-network theory is ostensibly a theory of innovation that has developed out of a 
desire to trace the emergence and direction of new technologies and artefacts in their 
social, political, organizational and market settings. So, although actor-network theory 
is not itself a theory of projects, its interest in emergent artefacts (innovation), the 
output of projects, means that its subject matter tends to draw on projects. Callon’s 
(1986) study of the failure of the proposed electric car system in France in the 1970s, 
Law and Callon’ (1992) study of the failed TSR2 fighter aircraft in the 1960s in the 
UK and Latour’s (1996) study of the failed French transport system, ARAMIS, are 
now classic studies of fledgling project networks.   
 
Actor-network theory proposes a model of the co-ordination of actants (human and 
non-human actors) in the pursuit of technological goals. The actor-network approach 
“…rests on the idea that innovation and the strategies that shape it may be described 
in a network vocabulary that emphasises the interrelated and heterogeneous character 
of all its components, whether social or technical” (Bijker and Law, 1992: 18). 
Heterogeneous actor-networks are built by the active enrolment (translation) of 
‘actants’ into a single network. The work of translation is performed using 
intermediaries that include money, contracts, specifications, schedules, talk and 
prototypes, which are deployed to encourage other necessary actors to join the 
network and to control them once they are in place. Critically, network builders must 
continually assure other actors of the benefits of their involvement in the network. 
Intermediaries persuade and inform by carrying the necessary information to bring 
actors into line with one another. It is easy to see how for ‘network’ we could just as 
readily read ‘project’ here. 
 
Broken down in its constituent parts it becomes much easier to trace the evolution and 
subsequent success or failure of projects. The resulting networks can be convergent or 
divergent. In convergent projects the understanding of intermediaries amongst actors 
is shared with the result that they have predictable translation effects. Actors do not 
resist translation and translations are, therefore, efficient. Such project networks 
typically have clear and agreed ‘obligatory points of passage’(Law and Callon, 1992, 
p. 31) or ‘obligatory crossing points’ (Latour, 1996, p. 43). through which all other 
actors, translations and intermediaries must pass.   
 
In weak and divergent projects, actors do not all share a common understanding of the 
intermediaries circulating the network and many may fail to recognise the legitimacy 
of an organization or institution regarded by others as an obligatory point of passage. 
When this happens they will respond to instructions unpredictably and resist the roles 
assigned to them. As a result, key actors may begin to pursue their interests 
elsewhere. These networks are inefficient and will require plenty of ‘back stage’ work 
(c.f. Buchanan and Boddy, 1992) to keep them on track. They may survive to reach 
their original goals, but if they grow too divergent they will become vulnerable to 
collapse. Collapse occurs when important actors cease to be mobilised by the 
network’s intermediaries; they no longer perceive their interests to be served by the 
project and withdraw. As Latour puts it: 
“The full difficulty of innovation becomes apparent when we recognize 
that it brings together, in one place, on a joint undertaking, a number of 
interested people, a good half of whom are prepared to jump ship, and an 
array of things, most of which are about to break down” (Latour, 1996: 
58);  
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a situation surely familiar to many an overstressed project manager. 
  
A network approach to projects provides a useful descriptive framework – a single 
vocabulary for framing and discussing projects. The usefulness of actor-network 
theory, and what sets it apart from other approaches to projects, is that it focuses on 
the efficiency of network translations rather than other ostensibly more subjective 
measures of success (Linde and Linderoth, 2006); that is, the effectiveness of project 
management in building networks to bring about change (whatever direction that 
might take). An effective project is one in which network translations result in actor 
convergence, stable shared goals and a single obligatory point of passage.  
 
 
Multi-nodality and networks 
Actor-network theory is part of a post-modern social science that sees concrete reality 
as ‘emerging’ out of a multitude of interactions. Thus: 
“…the image that we have got to discard is that of the social oil refinery. 
Society is not a lot of social products moving round in structural pipes and 
containers that were put in place beforehand. Instead, the social world is a 
remarkable emergent phenomenon: in its processes, it shapes its own 
flows” (Law, 1994: 15). 
 
Nevertheless, the larger part of lived project experience is of repeatedly having to 
accommodate already existing organizations, technologies and bodies of knowledge – 
existing pipes and containers.  In the case of complex projects, all of these may need 
to be re-shaped (translated) to accommodate new project objectives – a process they 
may well resist. To describe these potential pockets of resistance in a network context 
we borrow the notion of multi-nodality from Wynne (1998). 
  
The concept of multi-nodality draws attention to the open textured and dispersed 
nature of most technologies, particularly to their distribution in different locations and 
contexts. Wynne observes that technologies are rarely the unitary stand-alone objects 
we imagine them to be. Rather they are fragmented and dispersed across distant and 
imperfectly understood contexts – never more so than when they are part of extended 
supply chains. Attempts to build extended project networks comprising multiple 
organizations, geographical locations and business cultures, result in a multitude of 
uncertainties and imperfect understandings as a result of the fragmented and dispersed 
nature of the network. Different nodes, with their own embedded management 
cultures, reward systems and operating procedures, which may not be entirely 
appreciated by project managers and others at the outset of the project, are drawn into 
the network with unpredictable consequences for project outcomes. We use the notion 
of multi-nodality to account for what we see as the inevitably brown-field nature of 
projects in that they emerge in the context of multiple pre-existing (usually 
organizational) contexts. This is unproblematic when those organizations are already 
well aligned with the aims of the new project, but in many complex projects this is 
unlikely to be the case. 
 
 
Sense making, framing and networks 
Achieving alignment in the context of multi-nodal project networks requires the 
addressing of issues of sense making and cognitive frames (e.g. Goffman, 1974; 
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Weick, 2001). This calls for project participants to engage in sense making (making 
sense of client requirements, interpreting design briefs, finding solutions to problems 
and so on) often from the perspective of existing embedded ways of working and 
thinking, i.e. nodes, that may be at odds with the requirements of the project centre 
(i.e. its obligatory point of passage). In this context of dispersed sense making its not 
always easy for distant nodes to accurately assess what is required of them. 
Specifications, particularly, though by no means exclusively, those that deal with 
broad performance parameters rather than technical details, are not a foolproof guide 
to what the customer actually wants.  
  
The concept of sense-making, as espoused by Weick (1995) and others captures the 
idea of a shared interpretive schema in particular contexts or amongst particular 
groups. Sense-making perspectives have a longstanding place in the study of 
management and organizations and to some extent in the study of projects. The 
origins of this approach to the study of organizations rests primarily in the work of 
Karl Weick (1979, 1993, 2001), Wiley (1988) and Gephart (1993), but insights so 
derived have only recently been applied to projects and project management (Thomas, 
2000). 
 
An understanding of projects from a sense-making perspective focuses far more on 
the processes of organizing projects rather than on the structure of projects and the 
capabilities and resources required to execute them. The concern is more with,  
 
“…the deliberate social interaction occurring between humans working together 
to accomplish a certain task…Thus a sense-making focus on project 
management directs us to look at the processes of action and interaction that 
enable individuals to make sense of organizational activities and how they 
interact to effect the emergent projects. Researchers are directed to explore 
ways to facilitate the inter-subjective sense-making to reduce communication 
failures and confusion” (Thomas; 2000: 42). 
 
This may appear counter to the mainstream understanding of project management 
with its focus on tools and techniques in the narrower view, and its focus on the 
contingent relationship between the business context which initiates the project and 
the different means by which projects might be delivered in the broader view. 
However, Thomas (2000), at least, argues that sense-making adds the insight that both 
project initiation and delivery are socially negotiated phenomenon and that the project 
itself is an emergent entity and not ‘given’ at the start of the process or as something 
comprised of external components (e.g. technology) which act independently of the 
sense-making process. We believe this to be a vital insight. 
 
What the sense-making approach highlights in the context of project-based forms of 
organizing – especially where these take on the properties of complex projects – is 
that different groups and communities do not necessarily view the projects they are 
working on in the same terms as one another. The lived experience or actuality of 
projects is much more likely to be fragmented by competing ways of making-sense.  
 
Arguably, the sense-making perspective offers a different insight. Conventional views 
of project management see managing projects successfully in terms of gaining access 
to the right information, whilst uncertainty, or weak management, is seen in terms of a 
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lack of information. However, the sense-making perspective invites us to view 
information itself as ambiguous and equivocal, which is filtered and re-constructed 
through different ‘frames of reference’ (Weick, 1995). In this view, the role of the 
project manager, rather than being one of responding to unambiguous inputs, is one of 
attempting to deal effectively with ambiguity.  
 
Expectations concerning complex projects are likely to be divergent and difficult to 
satisfy. There will be scope for failures of communication and more than sufficient 
scope for confusion amongst participants as to goals, objectives, the meaning of 
information and so on. The complexity of projects can be seen as disruptive to the 
sense-making process through the need for new interpretative schemas and 
frameworks through which to interpret and respond to stated requirements. 
 
Sense-making also has a strong contribution to make to an understanding of the 
translation process in actor-networks. The concept of sense-making draws attention to 
the inherently subjective nature of interpreting reality and its objects (which can 
include intermediaries such as specifications, project schedules and contracts) and the 
consequences of this for building and maintaining project networks. Specifications, 
however clearly written from the perspective of one actor, will be subject to variable 
interpretation by actors working with different sense-making frames who have to 
make sense of what is expected of them and what they can reasonably be expected to 
deliver. As the project network expands and more and more actors are enrolled into it, 
differences of understanding will also be drawn into the network. The result will be 
unanticipated further translations and unanticipated effects as the embedded habits of 
thought of individuals, groups and communities (Goffman, 1974) and, 'schemata of 
interpretation' (Snow et al, 1986) of individuals encourages them to order, categorize 
and label the world around them in different ways.  
 
Network convergence and divergence as a measure of project management 
effectiveness 
Based on the ideas from actor-network theory discussed above, our central 
proposition is that successful projects will be those that, in network terms, are 
convergent. This convergence, we suggest, is created not just by a convergence of 
interests (political convergence), but also by a convergence of understanding, 
knowledge and framing about what the end goals of the project are (cognitive 
convergence). A dogged focus on a stable set of goals can be crippling for an 
organization (Kaynes, 2005), but it is essential for projects. While actor-network 
theorists are keen to point out that projects all too readily fragment into multiple 
trajectories it is precisely the job of keeping projects on a single trajectory that project 
managers must achieve. Failing to do so, even if it is not the undoing of the project, is 
at the very least a source of great inefficiency. A good project will therefore be an 
efficient one in network building terms (it has achieved convergence around a 
commonly understood set of goals) and one that is therefore more likely to succeed in 
terms of satisfying key stakeholders. Such an achievement is akin, we suggest, to the 
organic organisational form outlined originally by Burns and Stalker (1961). 
Conversely, poor projects will be inefficient in network building terms and less likely 
to meet the aspiration of project stakeholders - as such they are more likely to face 
cancellation. These projects are divergent and require strong project management 
systems to hold them together. As such, they reflect Burns and Stalker’s hierarchical 
control focused ‘mechanistic’ organisational form.  
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From the theoretical considerations presented above, the delivery of complex projects 
depends on the successful translation of actors within the project network. Project 
managers therefore need to pay attention to this translation task, which is not 
something that is achieved through the application of the conventional tools and 
techniques of the project management toolkit as exemplified in the formal bodies of 
knowledge (although these tools may still be needed for a variety of other reasons), 
but through political and networking activities that seek to engage other actors and 
enrol them into the project. Multi-nodality in projects implies that project managers 
have to gain an awareness of the frames and sense-making activities employed in 
more distant parts of the project network that they may not initially have cognisance 
of and which may be at variance with those of their own organisational context. 
 
The notions of translation and convergence provide the possibility of shedding an 
alternative light on the interpretation of project success. In the next section, we 
attempt to apply these ideas to a reinterpretation of a number of high profile projects 
that have been widely recognised as either successful or as having failed in some way 
(paradoxically, sometimes both). The material for these cases is all drawn from public 
domain documentation and sources, rather than reflecting original empirical research 
on our part. The projects considered are the Millennium Dome, Heathrow Airport’s 
Terminal 5, the Scottish Parliament Building and the Eden Project in Cornwall. All 
were multi-million pound projects and all involved considerable innovation.  
 
Empirical illustrations 
 
The Millennium Dome 
The Millennium Dome and its associated exhibition were planned as the centrepiece 
of the UK millennium celebrations of 2000. The Dome opened its doors on December 
31st 1999 and closed them a year later. The aims of the project were not just to create 
a landmark building, which it succeeded in doing, but also to create a "world profile 
for the celebration of the millennium" that would "involve, engage and transform 
visitors and participants" and to do so on time and within budget (NAO, 2000, 16). 
The project failed to deliver against these latter aims, running both over budget and 
failing to attract the visitors required by the business plan. We shall argue here that 
the project should have been conceived of as an extended actor-network that failed to 
converge around a single agreed set of outputs.   
    
From its earliest conception the Millennium Dome project was undermined by 
divergent views and a lack of clarity regarding what it was meant to deliver. The 
Dome was originally conceived of by the outgoing Conservative Government, but 
was taken on by the Labour government in 1997. For the Conservatives the project 
was about “selling ourselves and our country” (Heseltine cited in McGuigan and 
Gilmore, 2002, 4). For Labour the project, with less of a business focus, was to reflect 
the British “spirit of confidence and adventure” (Blair, cited in McGuigan and 
Gilmore, ibid.). Ultimately, the exhibition failed to reflect either vision consistently, 
leaving visitors confused as to what the exhibition was about and the press unable to 
print favourable reviews (McGuigan and Gilmore, ibid).   
 
The Dome also suffered to some degree from the influence of ideology in its 
execution. In keeping with the political focus of the day the intention had been to 
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place control of the project in private hands. However, it proved impossible to attract 
a private organisation willing to shoulder the level of risk involved (NAO, 2000) and 
The New Millennium Experience Company (NMEC) was subsequently set up to 
mimic private control. The company, financed with lottery funding, had a single 
shareholder in the form of a Minister, Lord Falconer, answerable to Parliament for the 
performance of the NMEC. The project was allocated a net budget of £399m (NAO, 
ibid).   
 
The project had two streams of activity – both run by the NMEC – the creation of a 
suitable building and coordination of the attraction it would house. The building, 
designed by the Richard Rogers Partnership and engineers Buro Happold, was state of 
the art and a great success; it has gone on to become a major London landmark, 
currently as the 02 Arena. It was handed over within the 15 months specified and 
under budget at £43 million.  
 
The attraction which ‘the Dome’ housed did not fare so well. The opening night was 
regarded by the press as a fiasco of poor planning (in particular the public transport to 
the Dome) – the attraction itself did little to win journalists over subsequently 
(McGuigan, 2003, 670, 675). It was variously described in the press as ‘vain, vapid 
and patronising’ (Nutt, 2002). Visitor figures, though perhaps influenced by the press, 
bore this out. While the Dome needed 11 million visitors to break even, ultimately 
only 4.5 million paying visitors came to the exhibition throughout the year (Nutt, 
2002) requiring a further four injections of National Lottery money amounting to 
£179m (NAO, ibid).  
 
The failure of the attraction has its roots in the structure and focus of the project 
(NAO, 2000) and in the failure of the project to articulate and control the role that 
zone sponsors played in shaping the attraction (McGuigan and Gilmore, 2002). The 
National Audit Office notes that the management of the project was focussed on the 
capital delivery and insufficiently on the quality of the attraction or its technical 
operational requirements. With respect to this latter issue, there was, for example, no 
single team responsible for maintenance (resulting in numerous extended 
breakdowns) and operational failures (e.g. the long queue for the Body Zone despite 
much lower than expected visitor numbers). There was a lack of experience in these 
matters within the project (NAO, ibid) also reflecting this lack of focus.   
 
If operations were undermined by a lack of operations focus then the exhibition itself 
was a victim of further divergence regarding what the project was meant to be about 
which resulted in the failure of the zones, in combination, to deliver what Nutt (2002) 
refers to as the ‘wow’ factor and did not work together as a coherent whole. This 
outcome can be traced back to a failure to create a consistent vision for the service 
delivery aspect of the project. For instance, while the project’s original director, 
Jennie Page, in keeping with Labour’s vision, felt that the exhibition should avoid 
being a sponsor dominated ‘logo-land’ whereas her replacement, Disney Land Paris’s 
P.Y. Gerbeau, was more than happy to see sponsorship come to the fore in shaping 
the experience – not least in the form of clear and visible company logos and PR 
messages (McGuigan and Gilmore, 2002).  
 
The varied and uncoordinated nature of the private sector’s involvement in the Dome 
created a confused message ranging from a commentary on national identity to an 
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unrestrained promotion of private interests. Thus, while some companies sponsoring 
zones, such as M&S (the Self Portrait Zone) took a back seat in terms of its content, 
others ensured that their brand and influence was predominant (such as Manpower’s 
much disliked Work Zone). Other sponsors had a less straightforward relationship 
with their zone, such as Marconi, which saw an opportunity to re-brand itself, and 
BAE Systems, which sought to frame itself as a promoter of engineering education.  
 
Ultimately, the variable visibility of corporate interests mixed uncomfortably with the 
zone’s simultaneous focus on educating and the social commentary of works 
displayed elsewhere, such as the much praised ‘Boy’ and Peter Gabriel’s show 
depicting the negative effects of industrialisation. Arguably, this lack of project 
convergence around a clearly articulated set of themes contributed strongly to the 
weak impact of the attraction (McGuigan and Guilmore, ibid.). The attraction’s 
failure, therefore, can be justifiably framed in terms of NMEC’s failure to anticipate 
and control the shaping effects of its multiple nodes (i.e. corporate sponsors).  
 
The net result was that visitors, and the press, were unclear as to what sense they 
should take from the Dome (McGuigan and Guilmore, ibid.). While around 86% of 
visitors reported being satisfied with the attraction (NAO, 2000) it has been suggested 
that this response reflects a dogged determination to enjoy the event despite press 
criticism (McGuigan and Gilmore, ibid.). Opening night technical failures, along with 
a somewhat flat exhibition, ensured the Press, who were always key to the project’s 
success, were never on board.  
 
In characterising the event’s failure it is clear that a lack of focus on operations (as 
opposed to the completion of ‘the project’ as defined by the building) and a lack of 
convergence resulted from a vague notion of what the project was about and a failure 
to manage, therein, the project’s multiple and divergent nodes. In network terms we 
have a divergent weak and disaggregated network. In Burns and Stalker’s terms we 
have a project organisation that has failed to crystallize into an organic whole both 
through a lack of management effort to opportunities for that to happen and as a 
consequence of the varied and divergent interests of the private sector.  
 
The Eden Project 
The Eden Project is the culmination of one man’s extraordinary vision for a project 
that would ‘promote the understanding and responsible management of the vital 
relationship between plants and people and resources leading to a sustainable future 
for all’ (Eden Project Mission, quoted in Prance, 2002). The brainchild of Tim Smit, 
an entrepreneur and the man behind the rediscovered Lost Gardens of Heligan, which 
had become one of the leading tourist attractions in Cornwall, the Eden Project 
consists of a series of gigantic geodesic glasshouse structures situated within the 
crater of a disused china clay pit and housing a series of representations of different 
ecological habitats from around the world.  
 
The project was at the cutting edge of architectural design, construction technologies 
and required the building of a complex partnership of funders, commercial interests, 
architects, biologists, educationalists and others to bring the project to fruition. That it 
came together at all speaks volumes for the networking skills and persuasive powers 
of the inspirational Smit. In his telling of the story of the Eden Project, Smit places 
great emphasis on the networking activity necessary to build support for the project, 
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referring to having to make ‘…dozens of presentations throughout 1995, lunching 
until we dropped and drinking for Britain, creating a background of support’(Smit, 
2001, 64). It is easy to see the actor network in action here; a very conscious attempt 
at enrolment and network building.   
 
Achieving translation, of potential funders in particular, involved numerous 
intermediaries – the initial design sketches, models of the glasshouse structures and 
suchlike – but perhaps the most important intermediary was the very site itself. Smit 
recounts the visit of a group of officials from the European Commission who were 
enrolled in the project through a site visit that involved a hair-raising ride through the 
mud in a four-wheel drive (Smit, 2001, 139). Later, interest and support from another 
crucial set of stakeholders, the paying public, was stimulated by invited people to 
view the progress of the project from the vantage point of the visitor centre, and many 
certainly returned subsequently to witness the completed project.    
 
Project success also required translation of local stakeholders through the winning of 
minds in terms of the local residents, local authorities and development agencies. As 
Smit puts it: “[a] mountain of paperwork, a design team from heaven and some up-
country big cheeses count for nothing in Cornwall without local support” (2001, 103). 
Achieving this required: 
 “trust in the democratic process and not simply pay lip-service to it. This 
is hard work, requiring endless talking and numberless meetings, but 
there is no short cut to creating a constituency of support…without their 
[the local district council] support the project would not have happened. 
If your local community won’t back you, everyone else has an exit” (Smit, 
2001, 61-3). 
Thus, it can be argued that Smit instinctively perceived the need to build a convergent 
and organic project organisation while at the same time recognising the tireless work 
required to achieve this.  
 
Smit similarly recognised the need to build and maintain external support for the 
project  - a ‘global’ network to use Law and Callon’s term (1992, p. 21). The project 
required national bodies to be brought on board, particularly those being asked to 
provide the funding for the project. What was central to achieving this was mobilizing 
the underlying vision for the project. While this helped local actors to converge 
around the project aims it also inspired confidence in the project’s stability and 
apparent convergence among potential investors. This, arguably, is where Smit’s 
strength as an entrepreneur, innovator and visionary leader (Mullins, 2007) was 
critical. Under such circumstances holding the network together was a continual 
process and at various points during the project it is apparent that considerable effort 
from Smit and his team was necessary to keep funders on board and the key actors 
aligned around the project vision. In early 2000, the project needed additional finance 
and considerable political manoeuvring was required to persuade the banks to provide 
further loans in a context where future viability had to some extent to be taken on trust 
as the project was attempting something completely radical. Smit talks about a period 
when it was necessary to decamp from Cornwall to London to negotiate with the key 
project partners (Smit, 2001, 223ff). Without such deliberate activity to maintain the 
convergence in the project network, the Eden Project might well have gone the way of 
many other such endeavours. 
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The crucial feature of the vision he created for the Eden Project was that it served the 
interests of different parties in different ways, whilst still retaining the overarching 
attributes of environmental education and sustainability. It made sense to the different 
stakeholders, viewed through their particular cognitive frames. For the local 
development agency it represented a regeneration opportunity in a severely depressed 
part of Cornwall following the decline of the tin and china clay industries. For the 
banks it represented a viable investment vehicle given the convincing arguments for 
visitor numbers Smit was able to make. For the construction companies it was an 
opportunity to showcase their capabilities and to be associated with a project that had 
the potential to break new ground. Indeed, the Eden Project was awarded the accolade 
of project of the decade in 2007 at the Construction News Quality in Construction 
Awards. For the architects it represented the opportunity to apply their interests in 
geodesic designs, to showcase environmentally sensitive design principles and to 
cement their reputation as architects. Ultimately, as Smit (2001, 159) says: “Eden was 
never about plants and architecture, it was always about harnessing people to a 
dream and exploring what they are capable of”. 
 
Heathrow Terminal 5 
Our interpretation of the project to open a fifth terminal (T5) at Heathrow Airport 
stresses again the importance of project stability and convergence around a stable 
frame regarding what the project is trying to achieve. Critically, these frames tell 
project participants which trade-offs and risks are acceptable and which are not. In the 
case of T5 it is clear that what appeared to be a stable project network coalesced 
around the desire to create a smooth passenger experience as the terminal opened and 
BA flights were migrated in, was in fact carrying with it a number of unarticulated 
and irreconcilable demands relating to organisational prestige and broader operating 
requirements and realities. At the last minute these demands destabilised the project’s 
objectives and forced the terminal to open inadequately prepared. 
    
Focusing on the positives first; the building of a new Terminal at Heathrow Airport 
was a project of national prestige and importance designed to ensure that Heathrow 
cemented its place as one of the world’s premier airports. No doubt, as BAA’s CEO 
claimed at the House of Common Transport Committee (HCTC) hearing after its 
botched opening it will deliver this in the longer term. Teething troubles aside, the 
terminal was described even by its critics as an “architectural triumph” (Sackville, 
2008). 
 
The terminal’s construction was a complex project designed to handle 30 million 
passengers per year through the provision of 60 new aircraft stands. The £4.3bn 
project involved 13km of bored tunnels, two new terminal buildings, a new spur road 
linking to the M25, a new air-traffic control tower and other airfield infrastructure, a 
4,000 space multi-story car park and a 600 bed hotel. Planning for the project was 
begun as far back as 1989 and construction was begun in 2002. The terminal opened 
slightly ahead of time on 27th March 2008 (originally the opening was planned for 
30th March) and was delivered to cost (Brady and Davies, forthcoming, b.). Within a 
month of opening the terminal was functioning beyond expectations, at a level it was 
not anticipated to reach until three months in its operation (HCTC). 
 
From the perspective of many, however, one of the most notable outputs of the 
terminal 5 project was a disastrous first day and national embarrassment. “You are a 
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very large organisation, a foreign-owned organisation, and you made a fool out of 
this country” observed one irate conservative MP (HCTC, p.20). The MP was 
certainly not alone in the strength of his feelings; the opening was savaged in the 
press. By BAA’s own admission the project, while apparently well tested, came to 
grief on the day. The project’s main failing occurred in the baggage handling system 
which was overwhelmed by a number of otherwise minor failures. Security staff 
could not gain access to car parks, because they arrived earlier and in greater numbers 
than the system expected and therefore could not get to work. Software designed to 
read BA labels did not recognise the labels from other airlines that had transferred 
onto BA flights – an unanticipated occurrence. Baggage handlers, not only late for 
work, were also insufficiently familiar with the equipment and did not unload quickly 
enough. The computer system, recognising the potential for a log jam, did as it was 
programmed to do and refused to accept anymore check-ins. Short-haul BA flights 
were cancelled to take pressure off the system. 400 volunteers and managers worked 
around the clock to fix things. This constitutes a ‘normal accident’ in Perrow’s (1984) 
definition of the term, which stemmed from the unpredicted interactions that 
inevitably occur deep in complex systems (Brady and Davies, forthcoming, b.). But in 
this case, that problems would occur had been predicted (by BAA’s Union for 
example) and seemingly ignored.  
 
The outward confidence displayed by BAA managers, especially in the technology 
and their achievements prior to the opening of the terminal (Brady and Davies, 
forthcoming, b), was quickly interpreted as arrogance and complacency by MPs and 
the press. “Surely a company faced with real competition would be less likely to make 
basic and complacent mistakes such as leaving staff without an overflow car park on 
the most important day for Heathrow for a decade” moaned another Tory (Villias 
reported on theyworkforyou.com). This confidence is all the stranger given that no 
airport has achieved trouble free opening and that BAA was well aware of this fact 
from its own research. The eventual result of the failure was not only measured in 
terms of short-haul UK flights cancelled, the 28,000 bags placed in temporary storage 
or in terms of its knock on effects for building programmes elsewhere in the airport, 
but also in terms of intense political embarrassment for those involved, particularly 
for senior staff at BAA. 
  
Brady and Davies (forthcoming, b) explains the project failure as one of a lack of 
integration in the final stages of the project’s delivery. Colin Mathews (BAA, CEO) 
bares this out: “however well the airport operator and the airline operator, BA, are 
working it is also vital that the two are absolutely integrated…Around about or just 
prior to the opening of T5 it seems that that togetherness deteriorated”. He also 
reported to the committee that, given his time again he “would focus resolutely and 
determinedly on keeping British Airways and BAA in the same room tightly together” 
(Select Committee on Transport Twelfth Report). BAA, in effect, took their eye of the 
ball, but it is not clear why. 
 
Certainly up until just prior to the opening of T5 BAA’s project management had 
been exemplary. They had for some time been developing an ‘integrated teams’ 
approach to construction. These involved partnering style arrangements with 
contractors and designs to develop teams that would work together on particular 
aspects of projects (e.g. the ‘pavement team’) over five year periods moving from 
project to project and learning to work more effectively (Ivory, 2002; Brady and 
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Davies, forthcoming, a). BAA encouraged co-location of staff from contractors and 
suppliers at their project sites and even undertook some of the responsibilities of an 
employer with career development and training. Partnering for BAA also meant ‘open 
book’ agreements in which a margin was guaranteed in exchange for full information 
regarding project-related finances. All of this was designed to encourage the sense 
that BAA was the employer (Ivory, 2002). In T5 BAA, based on its research of failed 
projects, took on the financial risks of the project.  The concept of ‘integrated teams’ 
was also a cornerstone of the project (Brady and Davies, forthcoming, b.) and 
something that is referred to repeatedly in BAA’s representation to the HCTC.  
 
From the perspective of the theoretical core of this paper, BAA’s actions can be 
usefully interpreted as a means of ensuring that they created a convergent set of 
project actors, with BAA as the obligatory point of passage. Co-location and financial 
dependence (5 year partnership deals) meant that potentially errant nodes could be 
kept under close observation and influenced – keep your enemies close as it were. Yet 
this convergence fragmented as the opening day approached. Mathews was keen to 
stress his regret over this deterioration in ‘togetherness’ but did not explain why the 
deterioration occurred. This deterioration can be explained in theoretical terms. 
 
Law (2000) has shown how tight integration through the centralisation of control in 
complex systems may not solve operational conflicts. Complex systems carry 
conflicts such as those between safe operation and continuous operation, which can 
lead to catastrophic failures as those within the system are forced to try and balance 
them in favour of stakeholders rather than necessarily users. As we argue in Ivory and 
Alderman (2005) this observation can usefully be applied to projects.  The Terminal 5 
project had a similar latent propensity for divergence. The reluctance to delay 
(perhaps a ‘rational’ decision given the problems that BA and BAA were aware of) 
came from the top of BA, the main stakeholder in the terminal: “In reality the idea of 
delaying things by a month was not necessarily an option that was available to us. I 
think, in reality, what we would have been considering was a delay of a season, which 
is March to the end of October” (Chief executive BA, HCTC, p 6.).  T5 was not a 
project in isolation, but part of a transport system with its own rhythms – in this case 
creating pressure to open before the main travelling season. Further pressure to open 
on time would have come from that fact that T5 was also part of a larger programme 
of projects surrounding the modernization and growth of Heathrow.  The late opening 
of T5 would have meant delays to that programme. Significantly, T5 was also a 
highly visible exemplar of BAA’s competence as a client and project managing 
organisation. BAA was not without its political enemies, many of whom on the 
political right viewed the break up of BAA as essential for competitiveness. This was 
not a time to hesitate or show weakness. T5 was thus bound up in what Suchman 
(1994) has referred to as a ‘web of effects’. Although throughout the HCTC hearing 
BAA repeatedly refer to the passenger as being at the heart of what the project was 
about, this focus was not strong enough to resist the influence of contrary demands. 
Opening on time served the interests of BAA and BA, but at great risk to the 
passenger experience and, if we are to believe its critics, national pride. 
 
The Scottish Parliament Building 
The new Scottish Parliament Building at Holyrood in Edinburgh, prompted by the 
result of the devolution referendum in September 1979, was the outcome of a project 
 14 
that achieved considerable notoriety in both political and public circles as a project 
bedevilled by problems of both time and cost overruns on a massive scale. Three 
years late, the original estimate of a build cost of between £40 million and £50 million 
(Fraser, 2004) had risen by an order of magnitude to £431 million by the time the 
parliament opened its doors to Scottish ministers in September 2004 (BBC, 2004). In 
retrospect, what the project achieved was a landmark building for Scotland’s 
Parliament. Long after the debacle concerning the escalating costs of the project and 
criticisms over its management, the building itself won the Stirling Prize for 2005 
from the Royal Institute of British Architects, and by November 2004 had exceeded 
100,000 visitors (Scottish Parliament, 2009) and completed a process of regeneration 
of part of the Old Town of Edinburgh (Scottish Parliament, 1998).  
 
The Scottish Parliament Building was championed by the then Secretary of State for 
Scotland, Donald Dewar. The White Paper of 24 July 1997 makes it clear that this 
was to be a landmark building “of such a quality, durability and civic importance as to 
reflect the Parliament’s status and operational needs” (Scottish Parliament, 1998, 2) 
and this was encapsulated in the Design Brief issued to prospective design teams. It 
seems almost certain that these aspirations had a significant influence on the eventual 
selection of the Spanish architect, Enric Miralles, famous for his work in Barcelona in 
Spain and Utrecht in Holland, who in the words of Donald Dewar at the time of the 
announcement: “impressed the panel with his energy, imagination and creative 
approach to design a parliament building within the World Heritage site at 
Holyrood”. 
 
Miralles subsequently came to have a significant influence over the project, in 
particular through his intractability and unwillingness to compromise on quality. The 
introduction to Lord Fraser’s inquiry report records a handwritten note by Mr 
Ian McAndie, a partner at cost consultants Davis, Langdon & Everest from March 
1999: “Nobody tells Enric to think about economy with any seriousness.” (Fraser, 
2004, 8). Miralles, was clearly a potentially disruptive node within the project 
network, whose way of working was not consistent with the needs of the client for a 
project that could be delivered according to a strict timetable and to what 
subsequently transpired to be a vastly over-optimistic budget. 
 
The inquiry devoted most of its attention to the conventional project management 
approach to managing a complex undertaking such as this was. In particular, Lord 
Fraser questioned the form of contract (Construction Management) adopted, which in 
his view left the client open to far too much risk in terms of cost. It also focused on 
the conventional triumvirate of time, cost and quality, concluding that quality and 
completion were both preferred over cost. What is clear is that the desired quality and 
iconic statement of the building could never have been achieved within the original 
budget. On the other hand, if this was the primary objective, the cost overruns should 
not have been considered problematic. Either such a landmark building was worth 
paying for or it was not. 
 
An actor network perspective, however, suggests other factors also had a significant 
impact on the project. The choice of architect was clearly controversial and led to a 
number of allegations of excess, such as the widely quoted reception desk that cost 
£88,000 alone (Design Build Network, 2009). In fact, the design contract went not to 
Enric Miralles alone, but to a joint venture between his architectural practice, EMBT, 
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and the Edinburgh architects RMJM. The main interface with the project occurred 
through RMJM in Edinburgh and the conceptual design work took place at a distance 
in Barcelona. For the project manager appointed this proved difficult to manage. 
 
The evidence given to the Inquiry makes it clear that the architectural joint venture 
experienced difficulty in making the arrangement work, owing to a clash of personal 
and organisational styles. “…there is an entirely different cultural approach to the 
delivery of buildings between Spain and the United Kingdom. Enric himself had a 
particular way of designing that was less structured than one might find in a major 
practice in the United Kingdom, and those cultural differences create operational 
tensions.” (Fisher, quoted in Fraser, 2004, 104). It is also clear that the Design Brief 
issued to the competing design teams failed in its role as an intermediary, in that 
Miralles chose to ignore a number of the key requirements outlined in the brief, 
notably adherence to budget. 
 
For the appointed project manager, Bill Armstrong, this cultural difference proved an 
impediment that his conventional project management experience was ill-equipped to 
handle. The Inquiry report states that the project manager employed a highly 
structured approach to project management and attempted to impose that on other 
members of the project team. Whilst, in a conventional UK construction context, this 
would have been understood by architects and contractors alike, it was not 
appreciated by the Spanish architecture practice and by Miralles in particular. With 
regard to the communication problems that were evident between project manager 
and the architects the following exchange is highlighted: 
“Mr Campbell QC: I am trying to find out, Mr Armstrong, how much dialogue 
there was between the appointed designer, who succeeded in a competition in 
July 1998, and you, the Project Manager, charged with evolving the brief for 
the building, which that designer was going to design. 
Mr Armstrong: Very little. 
Mr Campbell QC: Looking back on it, do you think that was the right way to 
go about it? 
Mr Armstrong: It was not my choice. 
Mr Campbell QC: That was not what I asked you. 
Mr Armstrong: I think that is my answer.” 
    (Fraser, 2004, 106) 
 
The project manager appears to have been ill-equipped to deal with the issue of 
aligning the architect with the client’s timescale and budget requirements. His strong-
arm project management approach is reflected in the evidence of the civil servant, 
Robert Gordon, according to whom: the project manager “was taking a pretty firm 
line with EMBT/RMJM and was sending them increasingly strong letters. Now I think 
that has a significant part to play in robust project management, but I was a bit 
concerned that he did not seem to have a backup strategy and that the proposition he 
was making was that we would have to go for the nuclear option of sacking the 
Design Team, or at least sacking the EMBT part of it if we did not get responses.” 
(Fraser, 2004, 106). The project sponsor, the civil servant Barbara Doig, under 
questioning, expressed the position thus: 
“Mrs Doig: Well, project managers are replaceable. 
Mr Campbell QC: But architects are not? 
Mrs Doig: The architect in this case was not”. 
 16 
When he subsequently resigned, the project manager reliably predicted the financial 
chaos and delays that followed. He understood the implications of the actions of an 
uncontrollable project node, but appeared to lack the skills and abilities to manage the 
situation; a situation that reflected very different framing and sensemaking of 
architect and project manager. 
 
Of course, the tribulations of the project should not be ascribed to a failure to align the 
chosen architect with the goals of the project. Indeed, arguably the architect was 
aligned with the project vision, which was itself incompatible with the more 
conventional economic and temporal constraints placed on it by a client concerned 
more with political considerations than with project management implications. But as 
with many politically motivated projects, the lack of realism in the original budget 
may well have reflected the desire and need to build political support if the project 
was ever to get off the ground (cf. Flyvbjerg et al, 2003), rather than rely on 
conventional economic arguments that could have led to a solution within budget and 
on time, but that failed to provide the landmark iconic emblem of a new Parliament 
that ‘reflected the aspirations of Scotland as a nation’ (Scottish Parliament, 1998, 8). 
 
We have an ostensibly divergent network in which the two primary nodes, the 
architect(s) and the project manager, both try to construct themselves as the obligatory 
points of passage for the project as a whole. Both continue to function and both try to 
force the project through entirely different ‘frames’ – cost and time on the one hand 
and quality on the other. But this divergence, paradoxically, is the source of the 
project’s stability. So long as it has a project management structure which is 
apparently seeking to ‘gain control’ and ‘rein in costs’ the project’s potential enemies 
(the press, MSPs, public opinion) are held in check while the project draws on more 
and more resources. The client, we suspect, sees the design team as the obligatory 
point of passage rather than its own project manager. The project remains stable so 
long as everyone plays their roles. The project manager, realising he is caught in the 
project’s web, without a ‘nuclear option’, felt compelled to resign. 
 
Discussion 
Our reinterpretation of the four cases through the lenses of actor-network theory, 
sensemaking and framing, reveals the role that translation plays in achieving 
convergence and hence relative success for the project. Successful translation of 
actors in distant nodes clearly increases the likelihood of project success. A failure to 
translate such actors exposes the project to the effects of decisions and actions at 
variance with the needs of the project (as defined by the project management team, 
project sponsor or client). It is also clear that conventional mechanisms for 
exchanging knowledge, such as design briefs, contracts and the like, are not up to the 
task of translation, as competing frames override the intentions of those issuing such 
documents or instructions. The process of translation needs active management and 
perhaps can not always be undertaken at a distance. Mechanisms that bring project 
partners together, both in geographical space and in conceptual space are required. 
 
Managing complexity 
If we accept that divergence is the enemy of effective project completion then we can 
begin to formulate some tentative ideas with regards approaches managers might take 
to encourage convergence.  
1. Clear, consistent and stable vision from the outset. While visions might 
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change over time management should not allow visions to fragment into 
competing versions of what the project is about (the Dome). While complete 
convergence around a single vision might be impossible (arguably the Eden 
Project is a notable exception) the project vision should provide a relatively 
stable narrative that frames how these competing demands should be ordered 
in terms of priority. Changes in focus can be disastrous as the T5 case showed. 
Questions around good project management would concern an examination of 
the circumstances under which maintaining a stable vision is possible. 
2. Convergent networks are analogous to Burns and Stalker’s (1961) description 
of the organic organisation. Organic organisational forms, in contrast to 
mechanistic forms, stress the importance of communication and coordinated 
responsiveness to changing demands. This is something that BAA’s integrated 
teams have sought to achieve. One of the critical aspects of organic 
organisations, and what allows them to function so effectively even in unstable 
environments, is the shared and unswerving focus of its managers on the goals 
of the organisation. Regular and frequent meetings, as Burns and Stalker note, 
are essential in order to maintain that shared focus.    
3. Identifying and acting on likely points of divergence. Once there is a clearly 
articulate-able vision of what the project is about then project nodes should be 
considered in terms of their likely divergence and what might be done about 
this. BAA has sought a form of administrative vertical integration through 
integrated teams to prevent nodes forming. Others have reached out to distant 
nodes using visual media to re-shape how they think about the project, or have 
acted to bring those making decisions at a distance to the project (as with the 
Eden Project). In network theory this is referred to as ‘control at a distance’; it 
is the key role of the mobile network intermediary.  
 
Achieving convergence, we should stress, is a continual process. A convergent project 
does not reach an end state, but has to be continually ‘managed’ in order to hold the 
project network in alignment and to prevent countervailing tendencies towards 
divergence, i.e. the self-interested actions on the part of itinerant project actors. 
Convergence is thus an inherently unstable achievement, one requiring ongoing 
management vigilance and intervention.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have suggested that concepts and propositions from a number of 
areas of theoretical development in the social sciences, offer the potential to rethink 
project management in ways that could shed light on some of the complexities of 
modern complex projects. Whilst a growing number of contributions in the literature 
are applying one or other of these perspectives, our contribution is to suggest a way in 
which some of these ideas may be usefully combined to provide a richer picture of the 
operation of complex projects as networks within which different actors have to be 
enrolled or translated and in which the processes by which sense is made of new 
requirements and knowledge are more clearly articulated and understood.  
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